Journal of Business & Technology Law
Volume 10
Issue 1 The State of Concussions: Protecting Athletes
through Advances in Law, Public Health, and Science

Article 6

Product Liability and Commercial Law Theories
Relating to Concussions
Russ VerSteeg

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl
Recommended Citation
Russ VerSteeg, Product Liability and Commercial Law Theories Relating to Concussions, 10 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 73 (2015)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol10/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Business & Technology Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Russ VerSteeg*

Product Liability and Commercial Law Theories
Relating to Concussions

Introduction
This article explores legal theories that an athlete who has suffered a
concussion might use against an equipment manufacturer or seller. The prevention
and treatment of concussions resulting from sports participation has become a
topic of national concern.1 It is an issue that has received extraordinary publicity,
with the National Football League (NFL) taking center stage in the controversy.2 In
late August 2013, the NFL settled the class action lawsuit that had been brought by
former players for $765 million.3 The players’ suit alleged that the NFL had
concealed its knowledge about the dangers of concussions and other traumatic
brain injuries.4 The settlement is still pending final judicial approval as of the
summer 2014.5 One leading sports law treatise has explained that there are a
number of legal theories upon which an athlete who has suffered a concussion
could rely in bringing a lawsuit against an equipment manufacturer or seller
(hereinafter use of either term, “manufacturer” or “seller,” is inclusive of both):
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1. See Jon Solomon, SEC Asks NCAA to Take the Lead on Concussions, AL.COM (May 31, 2013, 2:55 PM),
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/05/sec_asks_ncaa_to_take_the_lead.html (quoting SEC commissioner
Mike Slive) (“[P]revention and treatment of concussion injuries is a national concern that needs and deserves a
coordinated national effort.”).
2. See In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No 2:12-md-02323-AB, 2014 WL
3054250, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2014).
3. See Darren Heitner, Breaking down the Proposed $765 Million NFL Concussion Lawsuit Settlement,
FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 1:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2013/08/29/breaking-down-theproposed-765-million-nfl-concussion-lawsuit-settlement/.
4. Id.
5. See In re Nat’l Football League, 2014 WL 3054250, at *12.
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Generally, a person injured by an arguably defective, commercially supplied
product has available at least three separate and distinct causes of action:
negligence, breach of implied warranty, and strict liability in tort. In some
cases, a fourth cause of action, breach of an express warranty, is available.6
In two distinct sections, this article examines the relationship of strict product
liability (hereinafter product liability) and commercial law theories to concussions.7
Also, although many different types of sports equipment may cause an athlete to
suffer a concussion, for the sake of simplicity, this article typically—although not
categorically—considers helmets in its references, hypotheticals, and illustrations.8

I.
A.

Product Liability

General

The classic sports law treatise, The Law of Sports by Weistart and Lowell, succinctly
articulates the general rule regarding sports equipment and product liability: “the
suppliers of athletic equipment have a duty to exercise care for the protection of
those who use their equipment or who may be endangered by its use.”9 Another
popular sports law treatise acknowledges that “in any sports-related accident, a
products liability suit that puts the sports equipment under scrutiny should at least
be considered.”10 That same treatise explains further:
Under a theory of strict liability in tort, a commercial supplier who sells a
product in defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer” is subject to liability for harm caused. Liability attaches even if
the seller has exercised all possible care and even though the user or
consumer has no contractual relation with the seller. The determination of
whether a product is defective is made with reference to a reasonable
consumer’s expectations. Assumption of risk and misuse of the product are
defenses.11

6. LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 15:14, at 15-23 (Gary Uberstine et al. eds., 2002); see also
Douglas Houser et al., Product Liability in the Sports Industry, 23 TORT & INS. L. J. 44, 47 (1987) (“Today a
person injured by a defective product has a choice of distinct, yet related, theories of recovery upon which to
base his action, e.g., strict liability, negligence, or breach of warranty.”).
7. See infra Parts I, II.
8. See infra Part I.C.2.
9. JOHN WEISTART & CYM LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 8.09, at 996 (1979).
10. LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 6, §§ 15:23, at 15-33.
11. Id. § 15:14, at 15-23–15-24 (footnote omitted).
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As a jurisprudential matter, the doctrine of product liability serves broad
economic and social purposes.12 Because fault (i.e., the failure to act like a
reasonable person under similar circumstances) is not a criterion for a finding of
liability in this context, product liability imposes the costs of injuries caused by their
products on manufacturers or sellers (hereinafter defendant companies).13 In one
sense, defendant companies are in a better position to guard against injury than are
the individuals who are hurt by their products.14 Hence, product liability imposes
accident costs on the superior risk bearer.15 As Thomas Van Flein has stated:
The touchstone of products liability is risk allocation. Liability imposed
against the product manufacturer for economic and non-economic harm
caused to consumers transfers the real costs of defective products to the
manufacturers and retailers (who profit from the products) rather than the
injured consumers or society as a whole.16
Athletes use many different types of equipment. Every piece of equipment is,
theoretically at least, capable of causing injury.17 In the United States, the theory of
product liability has come to dominate the liability aspects of injuries caused by
almost every type of equipment.18

12. See John Watts, Fairness and Utility in Products Liability: Balancing Individual Rights and Social Welfare,
38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 597, 615 (2011) (“[T]he evolution and merger of tort and contract law in products
liability was motivated by a desire to achieve a balance between fairness and utility.”).
13. See id. at 620 (“Enterprise liability forces manufacturers to internalize the cost of accidents caused by
defective products and thereby creates incentives for the manufacturer to improve product safety.”); see also
Bouillon v. Harry Gill Co., 301 N.E. 2d 627, 630 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (“A distinguishing feature of this doctrine,
apart from its effect on the requirement of privity, is that it does not depend on proof of negligence. This does
not mean, however, that a manufacturer is an insurer in all cases, because there must be proof that the injury or
damage resulted from a condition of the product, and that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one,
and that the condition existed at the time the product left the manufacturer’s control.”).
14. See Thomas V. Van Flein, Allocation of Fault and Products Liability: A Comment on Safety Products and
Human Error, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 141, 144 (2002).
15. See id.
16. Id. (footnotes omitted).
17. See, e.g., Hockey Player’s Neck Slashed by Skate, ABC NEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2008), http://abcnews.g
o.com/Sports/story?id=4271717 (discussing an incident where a professional ice hockey player’s throat was cut
by the blade of an opposing player’s ice skate); David Bown, Cubs Tyler Colvin Hospitalized After Broken Bat
Punctures Chest, YAHOOSPORTS.COM (Sept. 19, 2010), http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/blog/big_league_stew/post/
Cubs-Tyler-Colvin-hospitalized-after-broken-bat?urn=mlb-270755 (discussing an incident where a major
league baseball player was injured by shards from a broken bat).
18. See Houser, supra note 6, at 47 (“Sports involve the use of a large number of products; baseball bats,
football helmets, hockey sticks, bicycles, parallel bars, special footwear, sports cars, ski bindings and javelins, to
name a few. The sheer number and variety of sports products alone would permit the inference that product
liability cases abound in the sports industry. Furthermore, when one considers the context in which these
products are used, it becomes quite apparent that a defect is apt to cause injury to the sports participant.”).
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Most American jurisdictions have adopted Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts for their general definitions and rules regarding products
liability.19 Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.20
According to one commentator, “Section 402A imposes strict liability upon one
who sells a product in a defective condition which is unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer. The liability is in tort rather than warranty and therefore the
various contract rules, such as notice of breach, do not apply.”21 It is common to
define a product defect as one of three distinct types: (1) manufacturing defects; (2)
design defects; and (3) failures to warn adequately.22 Weistart and Lowell also
identify and focus on these separate potential defects:
[A] manufacturer must exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a
product which it should know would involve an unreasonable risk of
physical harm, if not carefully made. The manufacturer also has the duty to
exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe design for its products and
19.

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
21. Houser, supra note 6, at 47. See infra Part II for a discussion of commercial law theories.
22. See, e.g., Van Flein, supra note 14, at 157 (“Alaska law recognizes three forms of product defect: a
manufacturing defect, a design defect, or a failure to contain adequate warnings. If one of these defects is
established, the manufacturer will be liable for that product defect if it caused injury, because proof of a defect is
‘tantamount to “fault” in the sense that we will impose legal responsibility for it.’”) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 889 (Alaska 1979)).
20.

76

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Russ VerSteeg
may be liable for injuries to foreseeable users caused by a design which
makes the product dangerous for the uses for which it was manufactured. In
addition, the producer has a duty to test for and warn against any hidden
dangers.23
In a similar fashion, Uberstein explains the doctrine using examples from
everyday life:
A review of case law reveals that there are three basic types of defects:
manufacturing flaws, design flaws, and marketing flaws. Manufacturing
flaws can be described as individual product imperfections, such as a coffee
roll with a pebble in it. Design flaws impugn the entire product line. In
litigation concerning the Ford Pinto, it was contended that all the Pintos of
a given year were defective because Ford placed the gas tank in a
dangerously vulnerable position behind the rear axle. This would be an
example of an alleged design defect. Finally, marketing flaws arise when the
seller fails to provide needed instructions regarding proper use, or to provide
adequate warnings concerning less obvious dangers.24
Another key component of the definition of a defective product is identifying
what renders a product “unreasonably dangerous.” In their article, “Product
Liability in the Sports Industry,” Houser, Ashworth, and Clark articulate the
accepted general rule:
A defective product is ‘unreasonably dangerous’ when the product is
‘dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics.’ It can be argued that an allegedly
defective product used for an extended period of time without injury is
prima facie not ‘unreasonably dangerous.’25

23. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 9, § 8.09, at 999 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 393, 395 (1965)); see also McCormick v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods
Co., 144 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
24. LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 6, § 15:21, at 15-30–15-31 (emphasis added).
25. Houser, supra note 6, at 56 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The authors further state,

[c]omments g and i [to the Restatement § 402A] suggest that the ordinary expectations of the
consumer constitute the standard for determining if these elements are present. These comments
have led to the formation of the ‘consumer expectation’ test for establishing a ‘defect.’ Other
jurisdictions, however, have either rejected or modified the ‘consumer expectation’ test by
adopting risk-benefit approach.
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Their suggestion that a product that has been used for a long period of time is
prima facie not unreasonably dangerous may be especially applicable to helmets
used in sports.26 For example, if a school keeps a helmet for several years and many
athletes use it, when an athlete wearing it suffers a concussion, arguably it ought not
be deemed to have been unreasonably dangerous. But the coaches may still be liable
on a theory of negligence for continuing to allow athletes to use it for such an
extended and unreasonable period of time.27 Another important aspect of the law of
product liability to bear in mind is that courts have gradually expanded the scope of
potential plaintiffs to include a variety of bystanders who suffer injuries.28 Thus, for
example, a bystander injured when a baseball bat breaks could have a cause of
action against a manufacturer under this theory.29
B.

Manufacturing Defects & the Importance of Accurate Labeling

Sports equipment such as a helmet or ski bindings may be considered defective and
unreasonably dangerous if there is a manufacturing defect.30 A helmet with a crack
in it, for example, easily may be deemed a defective, unreasonably dangerous
product. Manufacturers today make helmets of high-impact plastic materials.31
Helmet manufacturers must meet high standards in order for their helmets to meet

Id. at 57 (footnotes omitted).
26. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 6, § 15:21, at 15-30–15-31. Uberstein
writes,
The determination of whether a product is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
depends on whether a reasonably prudent consumer would expect the defect to be present. By
way of illustration, a cherry pie with a cherry pit in it would not be regarded as in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous. The reasonable consumer would expect to find a pit in a
cherry pie every now and then.
Id.
28. See Houser, supra note 6, at 48–49 (“Around 1965, the definitions of ‘user’ and ‘consumer’ began to
broaden gradually so that today an injured plaintiff may bring an action in strict liability even though he was
not literally ‘using’ the product. Examples of the relaxation of this requirement include a bystander who was
injured by the explosion of a shotgun, the driver of a car struck by another car, and a bystander injured by the
explosion of a beer keg.”) (footnotes omitted).
29. See id.
30. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
31. See Impact Resistant Plastics Helps Make Sporting Goods Stronger, DUPONT, http://www.dupont.com
/products-and-services/plastics-polymers-resins/thermoplastics/uses-and-applications/impact-resistant-plasticfor-sporting-goods.html (last visited Sep. 10, 2014) (noting that DuPont outfits their helmets with impact
resistant plastic).
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certain uniform criteria for helmet safety.32 And manufacturers affix various
informational and warning labels on their helmets prior to sale.33
As was suggested above, a manufacturing defect such as a crack in a helmet
would likely be considered defective and unreasonably dangerous under the
Restatement rule. But perhaps more importantly, a helmet that is mislabeled as, for
example, an off-road motorcycle helmet when it should have been labeled as a road
helmet would be a manufacturing defect which probably also would render a
helmet defective and unreasonably dangerous.34
C.

Design Defects

1.

Introduction

According to Uberstein,
The modern products liability case often revolves around a claim that the
product is defectively designed. In such a case, the plaintiff impugns the
conscious design choice of the manufacturer and attempts to show a safer,
economically feasible design. In determining whether the manufacturer’s
choice of design renders the product in a “defective condition unreasonably
dangerous,” courts have been unable to agree on a single standard.35
Indeed, the issues concerning allegedly defective product designs may be
especially troublesome as they relate to sports equipment, especially protective gear
such as helmets.36
2.

Helmets as an Example

Today, manufacturers have developed sophisticated methods for manufacturing
helmets.37 It is even common for manufacturers to seek patent protection for
32. NOCSAE Board Approves First Helmet Standard to Address Concussion Forces, NOCSAE (June 20,
2014), http://nocsae.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/NOCSAE-June-Board-Meeting-release-FINAL-6-20-14.p
df (describing the adoption of new helmet standards to address concussion forces).
33. Ken Belson, Warning Labels on Helmets Combat Injury and Liability, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013, at D1.
34. See Bell Sports, Inc. v. Yarusso, 759 A.2d 582, 585, 594–95 (Del. 2000) (affirming Plaintiff’s jury verdict
regarding, among others, a claim that a helmet manufacturer breached the implied warranty of merchantability
when it sold a helmet designed for on-road use as an off-road helmet).
35. LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 6, § 15:15, at 15-24–15-25.
36. See Daniel Siegal, Riddell Helmet Led to Football Player’s Brain Injury, Jury Told, LAW 360 (Feb. 28,
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/514414/riddell-helmet-led-to-football-player-s-brain-injury-jury-told
(discussing claims against helmet maker Riddle, Inc. for unsafe and defective helmet design).
37. See generally, POC Research & Innovation, POC SPORTS, http://www.pocsports.com/en/content/view/pr
otective-concepts#helmetconceptssnow (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (displaying and explaining several
sophisticated designs for their helmets).
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innovative helmet designs.38 Many sports require that participants wear protective
helmets, and courts have on many occasions considered the issue of whether helmet
manufacturers and sellers should be liable for head injuries.39 It is certainly
conceivable that a helmet design could be considered defective and unreasonably
dangerous. For example, if a helmet were designed in such a manner that it became
brittle or unstable over time, it might be considered a defective, unreasonably
dangerous product.40 Presumably, such a design would be considered defective due
to the manufacturer’s choice of materials, choice of manufacturing process, choice
of bonding of the plastics, or whatever factor caused the brittleness or instability.41
Similarly, if a helmet were designed in such a manner that it had an insufficient
amount of interior padding or an interior protective material that failed to disperse
impact forces adequately, those designs flaws too could be considered defective and
unreasonably dangerous.42 Arguably either insufficient interior padding or interior
protective material that fails to disperse impact forces adequately would render a
helmet more dangerous than an average helmet consumer would anticipate (and,

38. See, e.g., POC Unveils the Skull Orbic Comp, POC SPORTS, http://news.pocsports.com/2013/10/25/pocunveils-the-skull-orbic-comp-helmet/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
39. See, e.g., Alexander Hecht, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sports-Related Concussions: The Merril Hoge
Story, 12 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 17, 31–32 (2002) (“Sports-related concussions also arise in a traditional
product liability framework, usually involving a football helmet manufacturer’s liability to a player who suffers a
concussion. In Lister v. Bill Kelley Athletic, Inc., an Illinois appellate court held that the ‘inherent danger’ of
football precluded a duty by the helmet manufacturer to warn a user of a possible head injury. The court denied
recovery to a high school football player who was paralyzed in a helmet-to- helmet collision.” (footnotes and
citations omitted)); John Helyar, Helmets Preventing Concussion Seen Quashed by NFL-Riddell, BLOOMBERG
(Mar.18, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-18/helmets-preventing-concussion-seenquashed-by-nfl-riddell.html (discussing the siege of liability lawsuits during the 1970s and 1980s where courts
awarded injured football players $46 million in damages, causing Rawling Sporting Goods Co to leave the
helmet making business); see also Brian Mills, Football Helmets and Products Liability, 8 SPORTS LAW. J. 153,
157–58 (2001) (“As football helmet standards were created and helmet design improved, liability suits drove
numerous football helmet manufacturers out of business. . . . Most of the companies like Wilson, Spalding,
Rawlings, and Hutch all dropped out of the helmet manufacturing business due to ‘[s]oaring insurance
premiums, exploding litigation expenses and the threat of excessive judgments.’. . . [F]ifty percent of the cost of
the football helmet is a ‘hidden tort tax.’” (footnotes omitted)).
40. See Houser, supra note 6, at 48 (“A defect in a piece of protective sports equipment is more apt to make
that product ‘unreasonably dangerous’ because its sole purpose is to protect the user.”).
41. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1543–44 (1973) (“Generically dangerous products may be further
subdivided into products that are unusually dangerous because of the manufacturer’s inadvertent design errors
and those that are dangerous because of a conscious choice in the product’s design.”).
42. See Bell Sports, Inc. v. Yarusso, 759 A.2d 582, 585 (Del. 2000). The express warranty stated: “[t]he
Moto-5 [helmet] is designed to absorb the force of a blow first by spreading it over as wide an area of the outer
shell as possible, and second by the crushing of the non-resilient inner liner.” Id. The Delaware Supreme Court
emphasized that “[a] pivotal factual issue at trial was whether the helmet liner properly crushed, as designed, at
the time Yarusso’s head impacted the ground after his fall.” Id.
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thus, render it a defective, unreasonably dangerous product).43 As Houser,
Ashworth, and Clark note:
The nature of sports, however, is such that a great many of the products
used serve the sole purpose of protecting the user. Face masks, batting
helmets, releasable ski bindings, knee pads and braces, football helmets,
goggles, railings, floor pads, mouthpieces, roll bars and shoulder pads are a
few examples of such protective products. A defect in a piece of protective
sports equipment is more apt to make that product “unreasonably
dangerous” because its sole purpose is to protect the user.44
D.

Failure to Adequately Warn

Even novice athletes know that sports equipment such as helmets may occasionally
break.45 Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat’l Bank46 illustrated the legal
importance of an adequate warning on sports equipment.47 In Nissen, the plaintiff
was severely injured when he tried to bounce off a device called an Aqua Diver.48
The Aqua Diver was basically a mini-trampoline that used elastic cables attached to
a circular frame to support a smaller inner “bed” from which someone could
bounce to dive into a pool or lake.49 Although Nissen’s pre-market testing had
shown that a would-be-diver might injure herself by entangling her foot or leg in
the suspension cables, Nissen did not include any warning labels or warnings in its
product literature to alert users to this potential risk.50 The court succinctly
summarized the applicable legal doctrine as follows:
[I]t is well established that a product, although virtually faultless in design,
material, and workmanship, may nevertheless be deemed defective so as to
impose liability upon the manufacturer for physical harm resulting from its
use, where the manufacturer fails to discharge a duty to warn or instruct
with respect to potential dangers in the use of the product. Generally, the
43. See id; see also Houser, supra note 6, at 56 (“A defective product is ‘unreasonably dangerous’ when the
product is ‘dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.’” (footnote
omitted)).
44. Houser, supra note 6, at 48 (emphasis added).
45. See Schutt Helmet Fitting Instructions, SCHUTTSPORTS, http://www.schuttsports.com/userdocs/products/
09_FB_Fitting_Instructions.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (depicting the instruction manual that comes with
every helmet sold, warning of cracks and advising users to inspect for cracks prior to use).
46. 332 N.E.2d 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
47. Id. at 825 (discussing the manufacturer’s duty to provide adequate warning).
48. Id. at 821.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 822.

Vol. 10, No. 1 2015

81

Product Liability and Commercial Law Theories
duty to warn arises where the supplier knows or should have known of the
danger involved in the use of its product, or where it is unreasonably
dangerous to place the product in the hands of a user without a suitable
warning. However, where the danger or potentiality of danger is known or
should be known to the user, the duty does not attach.51
The court explained its reasoning further:
[T]he law should supply the presumption that an adequate warning would
have been read and heeded, thereby minimizing the obvious problems of
proof of causation. We find such an approach to be meritorious, workable,
and desirable. Comment j of Restatement (2d) Torts, § 402A (1965),
provides a presumption protecting the manufacturer where a warning is
given: “Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it
will be read and heeded; . . . .” However, where there is no warning, as in
the case at bar, the presumption of comment j that the user would have read
and heeded an adequate warning works in favor of the plaintiff user. In
other words, the presumption of causation herein is that [the plaintiff]
would have read an adequate warning concerning the danger of a user’s
foot slipping between the elastic cables of Aqua Diver and heeded it,
resulting in his not using the Aqua Diver.52
Houser, Ashworth, and Clark emphasize two important points regarding the
adequacy of product warnings. First, “[t]here is, of course, no duty to warn of
dangers that could have been readily recognized by the ordinary user.”53
Furthermore,

51. Id. at 825 (citations omitted); see also Houser, supra note 6, at 51 (“A manufacturer has a duty to
instruct users as to the safe use of the product, and to warn of the dangers associated with using the product,
even if the product has no manufacturing or other design defect. Users of the product need this information to
determine whether to expose themselves to the risks involved. The standard used to determine whether such a
warning need be given is based upon what is reasonable under the circumstances. Some factors to be considered
include the normal expectations of the consumer, the degree of simplicity or complexity of the operation or use
of the product, the nature and magnitude of the danger to which the user is exposed, the likelihood of injury,
and the feasibility and beneficial effect of including the information. Gymnastic equipment and trampolines are
examples of sports products that often require warnings and instructions.” (footnote omitted)); LAW OF
PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 6, § 15:20, at 15-30–15-31 (“Although the analysis of the
evidence revealed no defect in design or manufacture, the court of appeals asserted that Nissen’s failure to warn
of the known dangers in the use of the Aqua Diver supported a strict liability action. Aqua Diver was a ‘defective
product’ dangerous to the user without a warning within the purview of § 402A. The appellate court also noted
that the problem of proof of causation in failure to warn cases should be minimized by the presumption that an
adequate warning would be read and followed.” (footnotes omitted)).
52. Nissen, 332 N.E.2d at 826.
53. Houser, supra note 6, at 52.
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[T]he appropriate standard for determining sufficiency of a warning would
seem to be whether an ordinary consumer could read and understand the
warnings so as to be able to take the necessary precautions. “Whether or not
a given warning is adequate depends upon the language used and the
impression that it is calculated to make upon the mind of an average user of
the product.”54
This is one reason why helmet manufactures routinely affix warning labels on
their helmets, and provide instruction manuals directing users to inspect helmets
prior to use and not to use a helmet that has a crack or other defect.55 Clearly, the
newer the helmet, the more likely it is, as a factual matter, that such a crack will be
attributable to a manufacturing defect or to damage in transit from seller to buyer.56
The older the helmet (i.e., the more use it has gotten), the more likely it is that, as a
matter of fact, a defect such as a crack will be attributable to someone having
dropped it, stepped on it, or the like, through ordinary use and normal wear and
tear.57 Therefore, in a cause of action premised on product liability against a sports
helmet manufacturer, there is likely to be a very difficult and complex factual
inquiry relating to the actual cause of a defect or a helmet’s break.58 In addition to
this factual difficulty of proof of causation, and in light of the fact that athletes
generally know that helmets may break, a jury would have to consider whether a
helmet that breaks is more dangerous than that contemplated by the ordinary
consumer: “To determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous . . . a
product ‘must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics.’”59
Like protective helmets, baseball bats commonly break during ordinary use.60
Also, like helmets, when a baseball bat breaks, it poses a significant risk to
54.

Id. (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 581 P.2d 271, 279 (Ariz. App. 1978)).
See, e.g., Helmet Safety Booklet, CASCADE LACROSSE, http://www.cascadehelmets.com/Helmet-SafetyBooklet (last visited Sept. 10, 2014) (warning players to inspect helmets before use); Schutt Helmet Fitting
Instructions, SCHUTT SPORTS, http://www.schuttsports.com/userdocs/products/09_FB_Fitting_Instructions.pdf
(last visited Sept. 10, 2014) (warning users to frequently inspect before use and including a checklist for
inspection).
56. Cf. Brumley v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 459 So.2d 572, 575–76 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1984)
(finding that proof that an automobile tire was relatively new along with other facts was sufficient to prove
defective design of the tire).
57. Cf. Quirk v. Ross, 476 P.2d 559, 562 (Or. 1970) (finding insufficient evidence of defective design
because the alleged brake failure occurred after 39,500 miles of wear).
58. See, e.g., Mosley v. Metro. Gov. of Nashville & Davidson County, 155 S.W.3d 119, 124 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2004) (observing that the first inquiry would be whether the defective helmet was a cause of the injury).
59. Vautour Co. v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1182 (N.H. 2001) (citation omitted).
60. See Felicity Barringer, Science Lowers Shattering Risk at Home Plate, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 26, 2013, at A1
(observing that scientists made great effort to lower the shattering rate of baseball bats but bats still shatter
55.
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participants.61 In one case involving a player who was injured when a softball bat
broke during play, the Kentucky Court of Appeals said: “It is common knowledge
that bats frequently break, and we think it is immaterial that a properly made bat
ordinarily will splinter with the grain while one made of defective wood may break
across the grain. The risk of injury is not materially [altered].”62 It seems unlikely,
though, that a court would hold that helmet breakage due to a manufacturing
defect should be considered the functional equivalent of helmet breakage due to an
inadvertent nick caused by a careless athlete who failed to take proper care of the
helmet.63
But the risk of breakage is only one type of risk that today’s helmet
manufacturers warn against. For example, one warning label for a popular snow ski
helmet reads as follows:

MEETS NF EN 1077:2007, ASTM F2040 standards
WARNING: Helmets for Alpine skiers and snowboarders – class B. No
helmet can protect against all possible impacts. Serious injury or death can
occur even while wearing this helmet. This helmet may be easily penetrated
by sharp objects and cannot protect the user from injuries to the neck, spine
or other body parts. To maximize protection, this helmet must fit snugly
and in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.
CLEAN AND STORAGE: Clean this helmet only with mild soap and
water. The helmet can be damaged by cleaners, chemicals, and some hair
care products. Keep your helmet away from heat sources and out of direct
sunlight. Do not leave your helmet in a hot car.
DAMAGE AND REPLACEMENT: Replace this helmet immediately if it
has been subjected to any impact, even if no damage is visible. Any impact
may damage the internal structure of the helmet and reduce its ability to

ordinarily); Ken Belson, BATS; Reminder of Broken Bats’ Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, at B17 (illustrating
the high risk of broken bats).
61. See Barringer, supra note 60.
62. James v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 299 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. 1957).
63. See Sexton ex. rel. Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331, 339 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that although
negligence of an injured rider arguably may have been a contributing cause of accident, the contributory
negligence defense was unavailable absent evidence of the rider’s negligence in using the helmet).
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protect the user from further impacts. Any helmet that has been subjected to
damage should be destroyed or returned to the manufacturer.64
To be sure, this warning label goes well beyond merely alerting a user to the
possibility of breakage and injury.65 In addition to warning users of the risks of
breakage, this label calls attention to the fragility of the helmet due to a number of
important factors that affect the integrity and safety of the helmet, such as cleaners,
sunlight, and heat.66 In fact, it is probably unreasonable to ask manufacturers to put
a great deal more information on their warning labels. As a practical matter, if a
manufacturer were to put much more information on its warning labels, it actually
might induce a user just to tune out the warnings due to an information overload.67
A product liability case involving a trampoline, however, suggests that there may
be a significant problem with the warning labels that manufacturers currently affix
to helmets.68 In Pell v. Victor J. Andrew High School,69 a 16-year-old high school
student was injured during physical education class while attempting to somersault
using a mini-trampoline.70 The equipment manufacturer, AMF, had affixed a
detailed, “heat-laminated” warning label to the bed of the mini-trampoline that
read:
Caution. Misuse and abuse of this trampoline is dangerous and can cause
serious injuries. Read instructions before using this trampoline. Inspect
before using and replace any worn, defective, or missing parts. Any activity
involving motion or height creates the possibility of accidental injuries. This
unit is intended for use only by properly trained and qualified participants
under supervised conditions. Use without proper supervision can be
dangerous and should not be undertaken or permitted.71

64. See generally Snell K98 Helmet Standard, SNELL MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, http://www.smf.org/standards
/k98/k98std (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) (describing other issues, besides breakage, that helmet manufacturers
often notify consumers about which helmet manufacturers often notify consumers).
65. See supra text accompanying note 55 (explaining that the warning label informs the user how to
maintain the helmet and how the user should treat the damaged helmet).
66. See Brian James Mills, Football Helmets and Products Liability, 8 SPORTS LAW. J. 153, 156 (2001) (“[T]he
expected life of a helmet depends on numerous factors such as temperature, humidity, altitude, pollution,
sunlight, storage, maintenance, the player’s position.”).
67. Drury v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 93-1414 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/24/94); 659 So. 2d 738, 765 (finding
that the product was not defect based on the expert’s testimony that overloaded warning is ineffective).
68. Pell v. Victor J. Andrew High Sch., 462 N.E.2d 858 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
69. 462 N.E.2d 858 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
70. Id. at 861.
71. Id.

Vol. 10, No. 1 2015

85

Product Liability and Commercial Law Theories
But the manufacturer’s warnings were in vain because “when the mini-tramp
was assembled by a faculty member at the high school, the bed was placed . . . [in
such a manner] that the caution label was on the bottom, facing the floor, as
opposed to the top where it would be visible to a performer.”72
It strains credulity to posit that an equipment manufacturer should be required
to provide instructions that tell an assembler to make sure that the warning label
faces upward so that it may be visible. Yet, in affirming the jury’s finding of liability,
the Appellate Court of Illinois articulated a rule that warning labels may be
inadequate “if they do not reach foreseeable users.”73 And the court noted: “Plaintiff
presented evidence that the assembly instructions failed to specify that the warning
label should be placed in such a manner that it would be clearly visible to a
gymnast. As a result, the warning label on the ‘bed’ was placed underneath, facing
the floor.”74
Another matter of concern to helmet manufacturers is the court’s ruling
regarding the warnings that AMF had printed on the frame of the mini-tramp:
“There were printed warnings also on the frame of the mini-tramp, however they
were covered by frame pads on each of the four sides.”75 According to the court,
“[t]he warnings on the sides of the metal frame were also ineffective because they
were covered by frame pads.”76 This holding is pertinent to helmet manufacturers
because helmet manufacturers currently affix the warning labels directly on their
helmets in a position where some athletes may not notice them.77
In addition, the Pell court noted that a warning could also be considered
inadequate if it failed to “specify the risk presented by the product.”78 That said, the
court characterized the plaintiff’s evidence as “sufficient” in part because “the
[defendant’s] warnings did not specify the risk of severe spinal cord injury which
would result in permanent paralysis during somersaulting off the mini-tramp if
performed without a spotter or safety harness.”79 Given that AMF’s warning label
had advised that the product was “dangerous,” could “cause serious injuries,” and
that “[a]ny activity involving motion or height creates the possibility of accidental
injuries,”80 it seems unreasonable that a court could impose liability on the
72.

Id.
Id. at 862–63.
74. Pell v. Victor J. Andrew High Sch., 462 N.E.2d 858, 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
75. Id. at 861.
76. Id. at 863.
77. See G. Larry Sandefer, College Athletic Injuries: Does the Buoniconti Case Create a Duty of an Athlete Not
to Play?, 63 FLA. B.J. 34, 35 (citing Pell v. Victor J. Andrew High Sch., 462 N.E. 2d 858 (Ill. App. 1984))
(examining a helmet defect case and noting that the failure to warn theory has resulted in substantial verdicts);
Ken Belson, Warning Labels on Helmets Combat Injury and Liability, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013, at D1.
78. Pell, 462 N.E.2d at 862.
79. Id. at 863.
80. Id. at 861.
73.
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equipment manufacturer merely because it failed to list every possible anatomical
part that might suffer injury while using a mini-tramp.81 The term “serious injuries”
ought to be sufficiently cautionary without the need for greater specificity.82 The
court’s holding on this issue appears arbitrary and capricious.
E.

Defenses

As is true in all litigation, it is generally useful to distinguish between direct defenses
and affirmative defenses.83 A direct defense relies on an argument that directly
refutes an element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case.84 For example, in a product
liability suit, one element that a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence is that the product in question was a defective, unreasonably dangerous
product.85 Therefore, one direct defense in a product liability suit is for a defendant
to marshal facts and reason that they tend to show that the product is not more
dangerous than a reasonable consumer expects (i.e., is not a defective, unreasonably
dangerous product).86 An affirmative defense, on the other hand, is an argument
that does not attempt to refute an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, but
instead, seeks to show an alternative explanation for the plaintiff’s injury or
justification for the defendant’s conduct.87
One very important direct defense to product liability that is available to some
defendants is very simple: they are not “sellers” as that term is used in Section 402A.
For example, courts have held that coaches and schools are not “sellers” for
purposes of the Restatement rule.88 Courts have also held that neither high school
athletic associations nor non-profit organizations that establish safety standards for
athletic equipment are “sellers.”89
81. Kenneth Ross & Matthew Adams, Legally Adequate Warning Labels: A Conundrum for Every
Manufacturer, FOR THE DEFENSE, Oct. 1998, available at http://www.productliabilityprevention.com/images/6LegallyAdequateWarningLabelsAConundrumforEveryManufacturer.pdf (explaining that symbols can be used
to replace words on warning labels, meaning an exhaustive list of dangers is not required).
82. See id. (explaining that pictures are sufficient explanations for warning labels, which makes the term
“serious injury” also seem sufficient).
83. Rebecca Lefler, Lack of Proof Versus Affirmative Defenses, DISPOSITIVELY (Jan. 6, 2013),
http://dispositively.com/2013/01/06/lack-of-proof-versus-affirmative-defenses/.
84. Civil Cases- The Basics, FINDLAW, http://litigation.findlaw.com/filing-a-lawsuit/civil-cases-the-basics.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
85. Kathleen Michon, Proving a Defective Product Liability Claim, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/proving-defective-product-liability-claim-29531.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
86. See LAWRENCE M. ROCHEFORD, INVESTIGATING AND DEFENDING PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND TOXIC TORT
CLAIMS 45 (2006), available at http://www.jlolaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Products_Liability_and_
Toxic_Tort_Claims.pdf.
87. Gerard N. Hill & Kathleen T. Hill, Affirmative Defense, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.
thefreedictionary.com/Affirmative+Defense (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
88. See Houser, supra note 6, at 49–50 (citing Hemphill v. Sayers, 552 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Ill. 1982)).
89. See, e.g., Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 605 N.E.2d 458, 462–63 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
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In a product liability lawsuit, defendants commonly raise five different (but in
some cases related) affirmative defenses: (1) plaintiff misused the product or used
the product in a manner that the manufacturer/seller did not intend (but the
plaintiff’s misuse must not have been reasonably foreseeable);90 (2) defendant
provided proper instructions or warnings regarding the product’s use which the
plaintiff failed to heed (and if plaintiff heeded those warnings the product would
have been safe);91 (3) use or normal wear and tear over time have significantly
changed the product from the condition that it was in when it left the defendant’s
control;92 (4) plaintiff assumed the risk of injury;93 (5) unforeseeable superseding
conduct by a third party (e.g., a coach’s negligence) was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injury, not the defendant’s product.94
1. Plaintiff misused the product or used the product in a manner that the defendant did
not intend (but the plaintiff’s misuse must not have been reasonably foreseeable)
Arguably, this rule should shield an equipment manufacturer, for example, in the
event that a person were to use a bicycle helmet when horseback riding. The rule
also ought to relieve a manufacturer from liability in situations where a user has
altered a piece of equipment, for example, by removing a foam inner-liner and
substituting another material inside a helmet.
In addition, however, “[i]n order for misuse to operate as a defense, the
defendant must ordinarily show that the use was not reasonably foreseeable.”95

The Wissels have cited no cases in which voluntary, non-profit organizations similar to
NOCSAE, OHSAA, and the National Federation have been held to be ‘sellers’ for the purposes of
Section 402A, and we choose not to be the first to do so, as we are not convinced that strict
liability was ever intended to apply to such organizations. The trial court’s grant of summary
judgment to the appellees on the Wissels’s strict-liability causes of action is therefore affirmed.
Id. at 464.
90. See Houser, supra note 6, at 55.
91. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 9, § 8.10, at 1001.
92. See Houser, supra note 6, at 56 (“It can be argued that an allegedly defective product used for an
extended period of time without injury is prima facie not ‘unreasonably dangerous.’”); see also id. at 57 (“Sports
equipment is especially susceptible to change through use.”).
93. There is considerable debate regarding the role of contributory negligence in this analysis. See Houser,
supra note 6, at 53.
94. See LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 6, § 15:17, at 15-26–15-28 (“According to
well established tort principles, intervening acts of negligence do not supersede the liability of the original
wrongdoer. Courts view such acts as foreseeable. On the other hand, intervening acts that can be characterized
as grossly negligent or intentional ordinarily do supersede the liability of the wrongdoer.” (footnotes omitted));
Id. at § 15:22, 15-31–15-32 (specifically suggesting that “bad coaching or faulty training practices,” assumption
of risk, and product misuse might qualify as the types of conduct that would be considered superseding causes).
95. LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 6, § 15:22, at 15-32.
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Foreseeability is typically a question of fact reserved for the jury.96 Thus, we can
anticipate that jurors will be called upon to determine whether it is foreseeable that
a person, for example, might wear an ice hockey helmet while riding a bicycle or a
lacrosse helmet while playing baseball.97 Such uses of helmets designed for one sport
yet being used for others would also open the door to the second affirmative
defense; namely, that the plaintiff failed to follow properly-given instructions
and/or warnings.98
2. Defendant provided proper instructions or warnings regarding the product’s use
which the plaintiff failed to heed (and if plaintiff had heeded those
instructions/warnings the product would have been safe)
Weistart and Lowell articulate this rule as follows: “The seller may avoid liability by
giving proper instructions and warnings which, if followed, will make the product
safe. The seller may also reasonably assume that such directives will be read and
followed.”99 Helmet manufacturers routinely provide instructions and warnings
regarding appropriate use.100
Quite clearly, athletes who fail to follow the instructions or who fail to heed the
warnings on the labels affixed to helmets ought not, as a general rule, be successful
in a lawsuit against a helmet manufacturer.101
3. Use or normal wear and tear over time have significantly changed the product
from the condition that it was in when it left the defendant’s control
Protective helmets take a lot of abuse.102 Football helmets are a good example. Not
only do they withstand the stresses placed on them by repeated impacts with the
helmets of other players and the ground, but they also get banged around during
transportation to and from practices and games.103 People drop them accidentally.
96. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1247 (2009).
97. Russ VerSteeg, Perspectives on Foreseeability in the Law of Contracts and Torts: The Relationship Between
“Intervening Causes” and “Impossibility,” 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1497, 1501 (2012).
98. See infra Part I.E.2.
99. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 9, § 8.10, at 1001 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmt. j (1965)).
100. See supra Part I.D.
101. C. Dewayne Lonas et al., Misuse: Do Warnings Preclude the Availability of a Misuse Defense, DRITODAY
(June 28, 2013), http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=572.
102. Tom Foster, The Helmet That Can Save Football, POPULAR SCIENCE (Dec. 18, 2012, 12:07 PM),
http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2013-08/helmet-wars-and-new-helmet-could-protect-us-all.
103. See How to Care for Your Helmet, DICK’S SPORTING GOODS, http://m.dickssportinggoods.com/info/ind
ex.jsp?categoryId=455706&infoPath=222978 (last visited Oct. 5, 2014) (explaining the importance of proper
travel care, the daily wear and tear that can impact helmet performance, and the need to replace helmets after
they experience impact).
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They occasionally strike goalposts and even walls.104 Ski, snowboard, and skateboard
helmets also routinely hit ice, compacted snow, concrete, asphalt, and unyielding
metallic objects.105 Given these factors, it is not surprising that occasionally helmets
break. This is especially true after several years of normal use.106 Simply because a
helmet gets scratched or nicked and then breaks during use does not render it a
“defective, unreasonably dangerous product.”107 Thus, if athletes use a helmet
consistently for a season or two, any breakage after that may be attributable to a
nick, crack, scratch, or gradual/cumulative loss of structural integrity (i.e., normal
wear and tear).108 Obviously, structural engineers could inspect the pieces of a
broken helmet to try to ascertain whether it had any nicks, cracks, or scratches that
might have contributed to its failure.
4.

Plaintiff assumed the risk of injury (but was not contributorily negligent)

Sports in which participants are required to or normally wear helmets are typically
such dangerous sports that participants may be deemed to have assumed certain
risks.109 Substantial and recurrent impacts to helmets occur in many sports such as
ice hockey, lacrosse, football, skiing, and luge.110 These are the realities of many
sports. But assumption of risk as that concept relates to the legal theory of
negligence is distinctly different from assumption of risk as that concept relates to
strict product liability.111 In order to assume risk for product liability, a plaintiff
must know of a product’s defect and must use it voluntarily in the face of that
knowledge.112

104.

See id. (discussing the incidental contact that helmets endure in non-sports settings).
See generally Marc Peruzzi, The Sally Francklyn Story, OUTSIDE MAG., Dec. 2013, available at
http://www.outsideonline.com/fitness/injury-prevention/After-the-Crash.html (discussing helmets and their
use in winter sports).
106. See When to Replace Your Bicycle Helmet, XSPORTS PROTECTIVE, http://www.xsportsprotective.com/whe
n-to-replace-bicycle-helmet.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) (explaining that normal wear and tear, from dents
and dings, for instance, damages helmets).
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See J. Russell VerSteeg, A Case For a Bill Recognizing Primary Assumption of Risk as Limiting Liability for
Persons and Providers Who Take Part in Sports & Recreational Activities, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 56, 89
(2013).
110. See Foster, supra note 102.
111. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 121 (7th ed. 1999).
112. See WEINSTART & LOWELL, supra note 9, § 8.10, at 1001 (“Under the strict liability rule, there is no
defense for contributory negligence to the extent that the negligence consists of the mere failure to discover the
defect or guard against its existence, though the doctrine of assumption of risk, as well as other forms of
contributory negligence, will be fully applicable.” (citations omitted)). See also LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND
AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 6, § 15:22, at 15-32 (“For an assumption of risk defense to be effective, the
defendant must ordinarily show that the plaintiff recognized the specific danger associated with the use of the
product but nevertheless voluntarily chose to be exposed to it.”); Houser, supra note 6, at 54 (“[A]ssumption of
105.
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Moore v. Sitzmark Corp.113 provides an apt illustration of assumption of risk in
the context of sports equipment product liability. In Moore, the plaintiff broke her
leg when her ski binding failed to release during a fall.114 Although the plaintiff had
signed a waiver of liability and although she was aware that skiing was a dangerous
activity, in order to determine whether she had assumed the risk of a defective
design, the court quoted the applicable statute for the proposition that she would
have to have actually known of the defect in the ski bindings and persisted in skiing
on them, notwithstanding that knowledge: “It is a defense that the user or
consumer bringing the action knew of the defect and was aware of the danger and
nevertheless proceeded unreasonably to make use of the product and was injured by
it.”115 The court explained further:
[Defendants] merely argue Moore knew her bindings would not release
under all circumstances. Absent the threshold showing that Moore knew of
a defect in the bindings, neither Salomon nor Sitzmark is entitled to
summary judgment on the grounds of incurred risk. The trial court’s grant
of summary judgment on Moore’s strict liability theory was improper.116
Although courts generally recognize this rather limited application of the
doctrine of assumption of risk as a defense to a product liability action, courts split
on whether contributory negligence may also operate as a defense.117 Illinois has
the risk will seldom, if ever, be a valid defense against a product liability claim by an athlete because the risk of
dangerously defective equipment is not a risk normally associated with sports.” (footnote omitted)). This is
also distinctly different from the doctrine of “primary assumption of risk.” See J. Russell VerSteeg, supra note
109, at 94.
113. 555 N.E.2d 1305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
114. Id. at 1306.
115. Id. at 1306–07 (citing IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-4(b)(1)).
116. Id. at 1307–08.
117. Van Flein describes an alternative approach:
The Ninth Circuit followed the Alaska Supreme Court’s lead and held “that comparative fault
(i.e., contributory negligence) concepts can be applied to the doctrine of strict products liability.”
Subsequently, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized in Dura Corp. v. Harned and Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck, two types of comparative negligence in products liability cases: product
misuse and unreasonable and voluntary assumption of risk. The court in Ingersoll-Rand changed
its reasoning by concluding that as of 1986, with the enactment of the first statutory tort reform
legislation, even “ordinary negligence” is an affirmative defense in a products liability action.
Van Flein, supra note 14, at 155 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Moreover, he explains:
Some courts and commentators have characterized the attempt as involving “apples and
oranges.” A more accurate analysis might characterize the effort as an attempt to measure the
amount of water in an empty glass. I find it simply illogical to attempt to quantify fault where
admittedly none exists. Notwithstanding the doctrinal conflict, the Alaska Supreme Court has
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taken a complex but apparently workable stance on this issue. In Pell v. Victor J.
Andrew High School, the court explained,
[i]n Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., our supreme court upheld the principle
that contributory negligence is not a defense in a strict product liability tort
action. Comparative fault is applicable to strict liability cases, the court
determined, but only insofar as the defenses of misuse and assumption of
the risk are concerned. Moreover, these defenses no longer preclude recovery
in such actions. Thus, once a defendant’s liability is established, and where
both the defective product and the plaintiff’s misconduct contribute to cause
the damages, the comparative fault principle will operate to reduce the
plaintiff’s recovery by that amount which the trier of fact finds him at fault.
In the case at bar, AMF failed to establish that plaintiff’s alleged negligence
rose to the level of misuse of the mini-tramp or that she assumed the risk of
injury.118
Thus, under the Illinois rule, an athlete who either misuses a product or who
assumes the risk (e.g., by knowingly using a helmet with a crack in it) would be able
to recover damages on a strict product liability theory, but his recovery would be
decreased by his proportion of fault (i.e., by the percentage that the jury determines
that his misuse or assumption of risk contributed to his/her injuries).119 But like the
traditionally allowed comparative negligence in products liability cases, noting that “it would be
anomalous in a products liability case to have damages mitigated if the plaintiff sues in
negligence, but allow him to recover full damages if he sues in strict liability.” The court stated
that “the public policy reasons for strict product liability do not seem to be incompatible with
comparative negligence. The manufacturer is still accountable for all the harm from a defective
product, except that part caused by the consumer’s own conduct.”
Id. at 156 (citations and footnotes omitted).
118. 462 N.E.2d 858, 864–65 (citations omitted) (discussing Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197 (Ill.
1983)).
Another defense applicable to products liability claims is that of ‘misuse.’ This defense is akin to
contributory and comparative fault and may in fact be described as derivative of those principles.
The underlying idea is that a seller is entitled to expect that his product will be put to the use
normally intended for it.
Houser, supra note 6, at 55.
119. See Houser, supra note 6, at 53 (“In comment n of Section 402A, the drafters explained that
contributory negligence is not an available defense to a strict liability claim, while assumption of risk is. . . .”).
As Houser explains:
[T]his Section . . . is not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied
to strict liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense
when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to
guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand, the form of contributory
negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
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limited application of assumption of risk principles, this limited application of
comparative negligence should not be confused with ordinary comparative
negligence.120
5. Unforeseeable superseding conduct by a third party (e.g., a coach’s gross
negligence) was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, not the defendant’s
product
Theoretically, if a third party’s conduct intervenes in an unforeseeable manner, that
third party’s unforeseeable act may relieve a defendant equipment manufacturer or
seller of liability for injury caused by a defective product.121 For example, if a high
school coach were to recognize that a new helmet had a defect (e.g., a crack) but
nevertheless, with knowledge of that defect, still instructed an athlete to use it,
arguably such irrational conduct on the coach’s part would be considered “grossly
negligent” or “extraordinarily negligent.”122 As a rule, extraordinary negligence by a
danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this
Section as in other cases of strict liability. The rule laid out in Section 402A comment n may be
abbreviated to say “that failure to discover a defect is not a defense, but that use after discovery of
a defect is. Prosser notes that several cases have recognized and applied this distinction. At any
rate, the defense of contributory negligence has been properly criticized for its harshness and
most states have abandoned it in favor of comparative negligence principles.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Additionally:
It has been said that, ‘the major distinction drawn between contributory negligence and
assumption of risk is that the former is tested by an objective standard, i.e., whether the person
failed to act as a reasonable person, while the latter is tested for a subjective standard, i.e.,
whether this plaintiff actually understood and voluntarily accepted the risk of danger.’ Although
the defense of assumption of risk has been limited or abolished in several states, where it is still
viable it has been held to be a proper defense to a strict liability claim. Furthermore, there is a
traditional line of thought that participants in athletic events and spectators at those events . . .
[are] held to have assumed the risks of injury normally associated with the sport.
Id. at 53–54 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 55 (“It is generally felt that the application of comparative
liability principles to strict products liability will result in a much fairer allocation of damages than under the
harsh, all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence.”).
120. See Houser, supra note 6, at 54 (“Although a majority of the jurisdictions which have faced this issue
have ruled in favor of some kind of comparison between plaintiff’s misconduct and the defendant’s defective
product, some courts have refused to allow a comparative negligence defense in such an action.” (footnote
omitted)); Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee,
57 TENN. L. REV. 199, 294–303 (1990) (discussing the role that comparative fault plays in strict liability).
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442(d); e.g., Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So.2d 1285, 1293 (La.
1978) (“[F]ault of a ‘third person’ which exonerates a person from his own obligation importing strict liability
. . . is that which is the sole cause of the damage, of the nature of an irresistible and unforeseeable occurrence.”).
122. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 147, at 348, 350–51 (2000) (describing extraordinary negligent
as, “[a] high, though unspecified degree of negligen[t] . . . conduct that is appreciably more risky, or less
beneficial, than conduct qualifying as ordinary negligence”).
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third party is considered unforeseeable.123 An act is considered unforeseeable if it is
such that a reasonable person would not have anticipated it.124 Therefore, arguably,
a reasonable person would not anticipate that a high school coach would knowingly
instruct an athlete to use a cracked helmet.125 Lawyers use a term of art to describe
unforeseeable intervening acts. We label such acts by a third party which are
unforeseeable as “superseding” acts.126 Acts by a third party which are unforeseeable
and therefore “superseding” are said to “break the chain of causation,” and thereby
would legally supersede an equipment manufacturer’s liability (i.e., a superseding
act relieves a manufacturer of liability).127 Hence, it is likely that a helmet
manufacturer would be relieved of liability for injury caused by a cracked helmet if
a coach were to have knowingly instructed an athlete to use it.128 The coach’s
conduct would be considered a superseding cause, relieving the helmet
manufacturer or seller of liability.129

II.
A.

Commercial Law Theories

General

In addition to strict product liability, an athlete who has suffered a concussion may
also (or in the alternative) look to commercial law; specifically the Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”) for legal theories of recovery against manufacturers or
sellers. Under the UCC, one theory of legal liability available to plaintiffs is warranty

123. See RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 447(c) cmt. g (explaining that “the negligence of the act may be
so great or the third person’s conduct so reckless as to make it appear an extraordinary response to the situation
created by the actor and therefore a superseding cause of the other’s harm”).
124. See DOBBS, supra note 122; see also Pell v. Victor J. Andrew High Sch., 462 N.E. 2d 858, 863 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1984) (“Foreseeability means that which is objectively reasonable to expect not what might conceivably
occur.”) (citations omitted).
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. b (identifying a reasonable person as “a person
exercising those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its
members for the protection of their own interests and the interests of others.”).
126. See id. § 440.
127. See id. §§ 440–42.
128. See id. § 442(e) (considering “the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which
is wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the third person to liability to him”); id. § 449 (stating that,
“[i]f the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner in the hazard or one of the hazards which
makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby”); see also id. §449 cmt. a (clarifying that § 449
applies “only where the actor is under a duty to the other, because of some relation between them, to protect
him against such misconduct, or where the actor has undertaken the obligation of doing so, or his conduct has
created or increased the risk of harm through the misconduct, that he becomes negligent”).
129. See id. §440 (“A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention
prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor
in bringing about.”).
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law. Every jurisdiction in the United States except Louisiana has adopted Article 2
of the UCC.130 Article 2 provides at least three different warranties that are likely to
apply in the sale of most helmets and other sporting goods equipment.131
Specifically, the most obvious warranty theories are breach of: (1) express
warranty;132 (2) implied warranty of merchantability;133 and, (3) implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose.134 In addition to these, another commercial law
theory that an injured plaintiff should keep in mind arises under the warranties
created pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.135 The UCC warranties may
apply to the various types of equipment and apparatus used by athletes which
constitute “goods” as that term is defined in the UCC,136 including items such as
helmets, skateboards, snowboards, bicycles, skis, and many other implements
commonly used in a variety of sports and recreational activities.137
B.

Express Warranty

According to § 2-313 of the UCC, a seller may create an express warranty in a
number of ways.

§ 2-313 Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description,
Sample.

130.

U.C.C. Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Code Has Been Adopted 1 U.L.A. 1, 1–2 (Supp. 2012).
See U.C.C. § 2-313 (2012) (“Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample.”);
U.C.C. § 2-314 (2014) (“Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade.”); U.C.C. § 2-315 (2014)
(“Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose.”).
132. U.C.C. § 2-313 (2012).
133. Id. § 2-314.
134. Id. § 2-315. Sellers may, however, exclude or modify these warranties by employing the “exclusion or
modification of warranties” machinery in U.C.C. § 2-316 (2012). See infra Part II.E.2.
135. See Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (2012). A
potential stumbling block in applying the warranties defined in the Magnuson-Moss Act is that it applies only
to sales of a “consumer product.” Id. § 2301(6). “Consumer product” is defined as “any tangible personal
property which is distributed in commerce which is normally used for personal, family, or household
purposes.” Id. § 2301(1). Whether sporting goods or apparatus would be considered a “consumer product” as
defined by Magnuson-Moss has not yet been determined by statutory interpretation. A related issue is whether
sporting goods should be considered “consumer goods” as that term is used in the UCC. See U.C.C. § 9102(1)(w) (2012) (defining “consumer goods” as “goods that are used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes”). For more on the potential applicability of the Magnuson-Moss Act see infra
Part II.F.
136. U.C.C. § 2-105 (2012) (defining “goods” as “all things (including specifically manufactured goods)
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price
is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action”).
137. See id.; see also Jarstad v. Takoma Outdoor Recreation, Inc., 10 P.2d 278, 282 (Okla. 1974) (finding that
sports equipment is a “good” as defined in the UCC).
131.
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(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the
sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee” or that he have a
specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion
or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.138
Any affirmation of fact or promise that relates to the goods creates an express
warranty.139 For example, the BELL “Adrenaline” bicycle helmet is sold with an
attached cardboard label that states: “customized comfort easy strap adjustment for
a cool ride for a seamless finish sun protection no pinch buckling.”140 The label also
states: “SpinAction Fit offers the ability to customize fit. Simply pinch center of fit
belt and turn dial.”141 And on the same label there is a separate rectangular section
that affirms: “COMPLIES WITH US CPSC SAFETY STANDARD FOR BICYCLE
HELMETS FPR PERSONS AGE 5 AND OLDER.”142 On the interior of the BELL
“Adrenaline” helmet itself, a sticker is attached which repeats the CPSC
compliance.143 That sticker states, in part, “[c]omplies with US CPSC safety standard
for Bicycle Helmets for persons 5 and older.”144

138.

U.C.C. § 2-313 (2012).
Id. § 2-313(1)(a) (2012); see also LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 6, § 15.14, at
15-23–15-24 (discussing express warranty and tortuous misrepresentation).
140. Helmet Label, Bell Sports, Features for Adrenaline Bicycle Helemet (2011) (on file with author).
141. Id.
142. CPSC Label, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, External CPSC Saftey Warning (on file with author); see
also Bicycle Helmets for the 2011 Season, BICYCLE HELMET SAFETY INSTITUTE, http://www.helmets.org/helmet
11.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
143. Internal Saftey Label, Bell Sports, CPSC Saftey Warning on Inside of Adrenaline Bicycle Helmet (2011)
(on file with author).
144. Id.; 16 C.F.R. § 1203 (2012).
139.
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The statements on the cardboard label contain language that creates express
warranties.145 They claim that the helmet’s characteristics provide several benefits
for a user, including protection from the sun as well as being easy to adjust the fit.146
The CPSC language on both the cardboard and interior also create an express
warranty that the helmet meets the standards established by the United States
Consumer Product Safety Commission.147
Most of the information on the cardboard label and the interior sticker is factual,
and thus constitutes language that creates express warranties. There is very little, if
any, language that is too insubstantial to be considered a warranty.148 Such
statements may be considered “puffing” and “merely an expression of seller’s
opinion” rather than an affirmation of fact, rising to the level of an express
warranty.149 The statement that may come closest to puffing is “Camlocks offer easy
strap adjustment.”150 The word “easy” is perhaps so subjective that it may not create
an express warranty.151
Similarly, any sample or model of the goods also creates an express warranty that
the goods will conform to the sample or model.152 Thus, the photographs of bikers
wearing helmets on both the front and back of the cardboard label constitute an
express warranty that the helmet purchased by the buyer will look like the helmet
represented on the cardboard label picture (i.e., model).153

145. See U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b) (2012) (stating that “any description of the goods which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description”).
146. See Helmet Label, supra note 140.
147. See Bicycle Helmets for the 2011 Season, supra note 142.
148. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (2012) (clarifying that “an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a
statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a
warranty”).
149. Id. § 2-213. See also id. § 2-313 cmt. 8 (2014) (“Concerning affirmations of value or a seller’s opinion
or commendation under subsection (2), the basic question remains the same: What statements of the seller have
in the circumstances and in objective judgment become part of the basis of the bargain.”). The Fifth Circuit
ruled that non-actionable “puffery” comes in two forms: 1) an exaggerated, blustering, and boasting statement
upon which no reasonable buyer would be justified in relying; or 2) a general claim of superiority over
comparable products that is so vague that it can be understood as nothing more than a mere expression of
opinion. Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2000).
150. See U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (2012); see also David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV.
1395, 1411–16 (2006) (discussing “puffing” under the UCC).
151. See Carlay Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 1946) (finding that words such as easy, perfect,
amazing, prime, wonderful, excellent are regarded in the law as mere puffering); see also Presidio Enter., Inc. v.
Warner Bros. Distrib. Corp., 784 F.2d 674, 686 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Carlay, 153 F.2d at 496); Kesling v.
Hubler Nissan, Inc., No. 49D12-0901-CT-002954, 2011 WL 8000411, at *1, *7 (Ind. Super. Feb. 24, 2011), aff’d,
997 N.E.2d 327 (2013) (citing Carlay, 153 F.2d at 496).
152. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c) (2012) (“Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.”).
153. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 5 (2012) (explaining, “a description need not be by words. Technical
specifications, blueprints and the like can afford more exact description than mere language and if made part of
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C.

Implied Warranty of Merchantability

Section 2-314 of the UCC contains the general rules regarding the implied warranty
of merchantability.154

§ 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade.
(1) Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. . . .
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality, and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316) other implied warranties may
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.155
For this warranty to apply, the seller must be a ‘merchant;’ a term of art in the
UCC.156 Suffice it to say that a sporting goods store, a hockey supply catalogue

the basis of the bargain goods must conform to them”); see also Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598,
602 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding that the photographic representations made by defendant created an express
warranty); Ford Motor Co. v. Lemieux Lumber Co., 418 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (concluding
that a manufacturer should be “held responsible for advertising done by it regardless of the medium”);
Schumacher Immobilien Und Beteiligungs AD v. Prova, Inc., No. 1:09CV18, 2010 WL 2867603, at *1, *11
(M.D.N.C. July 21, 2010) (holding that photos provided by defendant created an express warranty).
154. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2012).
155. Id.
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company, and manufacturing companies themselves will generally be considered
“merchants” for purposes of this rule.157 In order to be considered a “merchant,”
triggering § 2-314, a seller must regularly deal in goods of the kind.158 A coach, a
school, another athlete, or an occasional eBay seller will ordinarily not come within
the scope of the “merchant” rule for purposes of § 2-314.159
According to § 2-314, in order to be merchantable, goods must “pass without
objection in the trade under the contract description . . . [be] fit for the ordinary
purpose for which such goods are used . . . [and] conform to the promise or
affirmations of fact made on the container or label.”160 Certainly, a helmet with a
latent crack in it or a helmet that is mislabeled161 would fail to be merchantable.162
Such a helmet would neither “pass without objection in the trade” nor be “fit for its
ordinary purpose.”163 The language requiring that goods “conform to the promise
or affirmations of fact made on the container or label” gives a buyer a valid cause of
action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability against a helmet
manufacturer for a mislabeled helmet.164 This is a very important warranty. It
protects consumer expectations by subjecting manufacturers and sellers to liability
when their products fail to perform in a manner that such products are supposed to
perform.165 In any circumstance where an item of sports equipment fails to function
in its ordinary manner and thereby causes injury, such as a concussion, it will be
likely that there has been a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.166

156. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2012); see U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2012) (“Merchant means a person who deals in goods of
the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction.”). In Section 2-314 on the warranty of merchantability, such warranty is
implied only “if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.” Id. § 2-314(1). Obviously this
qualification restricts the implied warranty to a much smaller group than everyone who is engaged in business
and requires a professional status as to particular kinds of goods. Id. § 2-104 cmt. 2.
157. See Russ VerSteeg, Pole Vault Injuries: Product Liability and Commercial Law Theories, 5 TEX. REV. ENT.
& SPORTS L. 237, 282 (2004). See generally Douglas Newell, The Merchant of Article 2, 7 VAL. U. L. REV. 307
(1973) (analyzing different definitions of “merchant” under the UCC).
158. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2012) (“‘Merchant’ means a person who deals in goods of the kind. . . .”).
159. See id. § 2-314 cmt. 3 (2012) (“A person making an isolated sale of goods is not a ‘merchant’ within the
meaning of the full scope of this section and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply.”). See also
Wissel v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 605 N.E.2d 458, 462, 464 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (stating that coaches are
not sellers within the scope of section 402A).
160. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a),(c),(f) (2012).
161. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
162. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a),(c) (2012).
163. See id.
164. See id. § 2-314(2)(f) (2012); see also Bell v. Yarusso, 759 A.2d 582, 585–86, 595 (Del. 2000) (affirming a
superior court and trial court holding that helmet manufacturer breached its implied warranty of
merchantability where a helmet was sold as an off-road helmet but was designed to function for “on-road” use).
165. Bell, 759 A.2d at 585–86, 595.
166. Id.
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D.

Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose

U.C.C. § 2-315 (“Implied Warranty: Fitness for a Particular Purpose”) states:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods,
there is . . . an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.167
This warranty could pose some rather thorny issues for many retail sports
equipment sellers. A novice coach or novice athlete may contact a seller, describe an
athlete’s experience level and physical characteristics to the seller, and then rely on
the seller to recommend equipment suitable for the athlete. Without a doubt, many
equipment retailers have greater experience in equipment selection than many
school coaches (a number of whom may have limited experience).168 In
circumstances such as these, arguably, sellers create an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, thereby potentially subjecting such sellers to significant
liability.169
This warranty may be especially troublesome for sellers who sell helmets for use
by athletes. Presumably, many athletes are tempted to use a helmet specifically
designed for one sport while engaging in a different sport.170 Manufacturers
generally are very specific regarding the lack of suitability of football, lacrosse,
bicycle, motorcycle, skateboard, ice hockey, and other helmets for use by athletes
while participating in different sports.171 Sellers who recommend a helmet designed
for one sport to buyers who intend to use it in a different sport could, conceivably,
subject themselves to liability under a theory of a breach of the warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose.

167.

U.C.C. § 2-315 (2012).
See, e.g., POP WARNER, POP WARNER COACHES RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK (2013), available at
http://www.cdpw.org/CoachRiskMgt2013.pdf (suggesting that coaches should always follow manufacturers’
recommendations for sizing when selecting equipment).
169. See, e.g., Golden v. Den-Mat Corp., 276 P.3d 773, 800 (Kan. App. 2012) (“[A] pair of shoes sold to a
person requesting footwear for mountain climbing may have a claim for breach of warranty for a particular
purpose if they fall apart halfway up Denali.”).
170. See Helmets for Many Activities, BICYCLE HELMET SAFETY INSTITUTE, http://www.helmets.org/other.htm
(last visited Sept. 9, 2014) (noting that the US Consumer Product Safety Commission recommends that ice
skaters use bicycle, ski or skateboard helmets).
171. See, e.g., Product FAQ, BELL, http://www.bellhelmets.com/product-faq/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2014)
(emphasizing that each Bell helmet is certified for a specific activity and should only be used for that sport, these
include cycling, skating, motorcycling, and auto racing); Terms & Conditions, RIDDELL, http://www.riddell.com/
(last visited Sept. 9, 2014) (stating that “any use other than the playing of American football” would void the
helmet’s warranty).
168.
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Helmets that comply with the standards established by various national and
international entities such as ASTM International, National Operating Committee
on Standards for Athletic Equipment (NOCSAE), and the Consumer Product Safety
Commission will have a higher likelihood of being considered as fit for the
particular purpose of any given sport for which those helmets are designed (i.e.,
being considered not to breach the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose).172 Nevertheless, manufacturers and sellers must understand that “the
mere fact that a product meets or exceeds the requirements of the industry is not
conclusive of reasonable safety.”173
E.

Liability for Personal Injury

A manufacturer’s/seller’s breach of any warranty—express (§ 2-313), implied
merchantability (§ 2-314), or implied fitness for a particular purpose (§ 2-315)—
could easily subject him/her to liability for injuries to an athlete pursuant to §§ 2715(2)(b) and 2-719(3).174 As shown below:

§ 2-715 Buyer’s Incidental and Consequential Damages
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller’s breach include . . .
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty.175

§ 2-719 Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima
facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial
is not.176

172. See, e.g., News Release, CPSC, CPSC Issues New Safety Standard for Bike Helmets (Feb. 1, 1999)
available at http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Newsroom/News-Releases/1998/CPSC-Issues-New-Safety-Standard-for-Bi
ke-Helmets/ (quoting CPSC Chairman saying, “[b]ecause of this new statement, families will know that the bike
helmets they buy meet stringent federal requirements aimed at preventing head injuries”).
173. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 9, § 8.09, at 1000 (citing Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 279 N.E. 2d
266, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972)).
174. See U.C.C. § 2-215(2)(b) (2012) (stating that injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty are included in buyer’s consequential damages resulting from the seller’s breach); see
also U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2012).
175. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (2012).
176. Id. § 2-719(3) (2012); see also infra note 225 and accompanying text.
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Comment 4 to § 2-715 suggests that an athlete injured by, for example, a
mislabeled helmet (i.e., breach of both express and implied warranties) could have
valid grounds for recovery against a seller for his or her medical expenses, loss of
income (if any), loss of future income, pain, and suffering.177 Comment 4 also states:
The burden of proving the extent of loss incurred by way of consequential
damage is on the buyer, but the section on liberal administration of
remedies rejects any doctrine of certainty which requires almost
mathematical precision in the proof of loss. Loss may be determined in any
manner which is reasonable under the circumstances.178
F.

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides another potential legal theory upon
which an injured athlete might rely for recovery against a supplier of sports
equipment.179 The primary advantages to using Magnuson-Moss are the possibility
of winning attorneys’ fees180 and the fact that, if the seller has created a “written
warranty,”181 he cannot legally (i.e., validly) disclaim either the implied warranty of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.182
In order to invoke Magnuson-Moss, the product in question must be a
“consumer product” and a “supplier” or “warrantor” must have made a “written
warranty.”183 As a general rule, most manufacturers and retail sellers of sporting

177.

See U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 4 (2012).
Id.
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (2012) (stating that under the Magnuson-Moss act “a consumer who is
damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this
chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract” can file suit for damages).
180. See id. § 2310(d)(2) (asserting that a plaintiff who “prevails in any action . . . may be allowed by the
court to recover as part of the judgment . . . expenses (including attorneys’ fees based on actual time
expended)”).
181. See id. § 2301(6)(A) (“Any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the
sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship
and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of
performance over a specified period of time.”).
182. See id. § 2308(a) (“No supplier may disclaim . . . any implied warranty to a consumer with respect to
such consumer product if (1) such supplier makes any written warranty to the consumer with respect to such
consumer product, or (2) at the time of the sale, or within 90 days thereafter, such supplier enters into a service
contract with the consumer which applies to such consumer product.”).
183. See id. § 2301(1) (defining “consumer product”: “[t]he term ‘consumer product’ means any tangible
personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or
household purposes (including any such property intended to be attached to or installed in any real property
without regard to whether it is so attached or installed”); id. § 2301(4) (defining “supplier”: “[t]he term
‘supplier’ means any person engaged in the business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly
available to consumers”); id. § 2301(5) (defining “warrantor”: “[t]he term ‘warrantor’ means any supplier or
178.
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goods will meet the definition of a “supplier” and “warrantor.”184 Many kinds of
sporting goods—but certainly not all—will come within the scope of a “consumer
product.”185 And, generally speaking, whenever a manufacturer or retailer makes a
§ 2-313-type express warranty in writing, that express warranty will come within
the scope of the Magnuson-Moss Act’s definition of a “written warranty.”186
Therefore, given the potential benefits (i.e., attorneys’ fees and invalidity of
disclaimers of implied warranties), it will often be worthwhile for plaintiffs to
consider using Magnuson-Moss as part of their litigation strategy.187
G.

Defenses to Warranty Actions188

1.

Lack of Privity

A lack of privity may be one legal obstacle that could prove difficult for some
plaintiffs.189 Traditionally, at common law, a person who was injured by a product
was barred from bringing a contract action against a seller unless he (i.e., the
plaintiff) was in privity of contract with the seller.190 Although the common law has
relaxed this privity rule somewhat,191 and although the UCC has a specific provision,

other person who gives or offers to give a written warranty or who is or may be obligated under an implied
warranty.”); id. § 2301(6) (defining “written warranty”: “[t]he term ‘written warranty’ means—(A) any written
affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to
a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material
or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund,
repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such product fails to
meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking
becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such
product”).
184. See, e.g., Jones v. Cranman’s Sporting Goods, 237 S.E. 2d 402, 406 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that
sporting goods store could be liable to plaintiff for defective rifle).
185. See, e.g., Najran Co. v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1061, 1101 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (explaining that
whether an item is a consumer product is a factual determination).
186. See Businessperson’s Guide to Federal Warranty Law, FTC BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION BUSINESS
CENTER, http://www.business.ftc.gov/documents/bus01-businesspersons-guide-federal-warranty-law (last visited Sept. 10, 2014) (stating that U.C.C. § 2-313 covers express warranties both written and oral, and that written
warranties fall under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act).
187. See supra notes 179–183 and accompanying text.
188. In addition to the defenses discussed in this section, Uberstein also claims that “assumption of risk,
misuse of the product, and failure to follow directions can defeat a breach of warranty claim.” LAW OF
PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 6, § 15:14, at 15-23.
189. See, e.g., Chaurasia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 126 P.3d 165, 171 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that privity
of contract is required to maintain an action for breach of an implied warranty).
190. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1990) (discussing common law procedure).
191. Id.
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§ 2-318, designed to address the issue,192 the rule may present special problems in
the context of sporting goods liability.193 Section 2-318 defines the scope of both
plaintiffs and defendants contemplated by Article 2 for personal injury.194

§ 2-318 Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied
Note: If this Act is introduced in the Congress of the United States this
section should be omitted. (States to select one alternative).

Alternative A
A seller’s warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his
home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.

Alternative B
A seller’s warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.

Alternative C
A seller’s warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit
the operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an
individual to whom the warranty extends.195
On the issue of potential plaintiffs, § 2-318 offers three different alternatives,
gradually progressing from very restrictive to very expansive. Alternative A
192.

See U.C.C. § 2-318 (2012).
See, e.g., Heggblom v. John Wanamaker N.Y., 36 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779–80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942) (finding
no breach of warranty where plaintiffs were injured by an exercise band that broke but plaintiffs did not allege
that they purchased the exerciser from the defendant thus there was no privity of contract between plaintiffs
and the defendant).
194. See, e.g., LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 6, § 15:14, at 15-23–15-24 (raising
issues related to U.C.C. § 2-318).
195. U.C.C. § 2-318 (2012).
193.
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provides, in part, that a seller’s warranty “extends to any natural person who is in
the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable
to expect that such person may use . . . or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty.”196 For purposes of illustration, assume
that an athlete is injured by a helmet. Even this most restrictive alternative would
provide standing for an individual who purchases his/her own helmet (or if a
parent, for example, purchases a helmet for a son/daughter). A more tricky
question is whether Alternative A would provide a cause of action for an athlete
whose school, college, university, or club purchases equipment for use by students
or club members.197 In that instance, the putative plaintiff is clearly a natural person
but the buyer is an entity (e.g., a school or club), not a natural person.198 Is a student
deemed to be “in the family or household” of the school or, alternatively, is a
student considered a “guest in the home” of a school? Presumably, the answer to
these questions is “no.”199 These same issues would apply to injuries caused by many
different types of defective sporting goods, such as goalposts, hockey sticks, balance
beams, parallel bars, and the like.200
Alternatives B and C are far less restrictive in terms of potential plaintiffs.201 Both
Alternative B and Alternative C would clearly give standing to any athlete who is
injured by an article of sporting goods equipment or apparatus under most normal
circumstances.202 Alternative B grants standing to “any natural person who may
reasonably be expected to use . . . or be affected by the goods and who is injured in
person by breach of the warranty.”203 Alternative C is even broader than Alternative
196.

Id.
See id. (providing only that family, household members, and houseguests come within the scope of
Alternative A).
198. See, e.g., Armstrong v. NEWVA Enters., 23 Va. Cir. 352 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1991) (stating that, unless
otherwise defined by statute, the term “natural person” means just that—a natural person).
199. See generally William Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-Privity Plaintiffs in
Jurisdictions That Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-318 (Alternative A), 24 PEPP. L. REV. 1215
(1993). But see Reed v. City of Chicago, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that the mother of a
prison inmate who committed suicide while incarcerated was not barred from a warranty claim against the
company that manufactured and designed the prison gown that allegedly failed to tear away when the prisoner
hanged himself with it).
200. See generally William L. Stallworth, supra note 199, at 1249, 1260 (noting the most important concern
with other defective sporting goods is whether the plaintiff non-purchaser is a member of the purchaser’s
family, household, or house guest).
201. See William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-Privity Plaintiffs In
Jurisdictions That Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-318 (Alternatives B & C), 27 AKRON L. REV.
197, 203 (1993) (“Alternative B, Alternative C, and various ‘nonstandard’ versions of section 2-318 go beyond
Alternative A in weakening the lack of privity defense.”).
202. Id. Potential plaintiffs under Alternatives B and C include non-purchasers. Id. Thus, the injured
athlete in the example above will normally have standing, unless, for example, the manufacturer could not
reasonably expect the athlete to use the product. Id.
203. U.C.C. § 2-318 (2012).
197.
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B, expanding standing to “any person,” not merely any “natural person” and even
adds: “A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to
injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.”204 Thus, all
three Alternatives to § 2-318 will in many instances include most typical athletes
within the scope of plaintiffs contemplated.
Comment 3 to § 2-318 addresses the issue of “vertical privity.”205 Comment 3
provides, in part: “the section . . . is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict
the developing case law on whether the seller’s warranties, given to his buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.”206 Hence, § 2-318 makes it
a matter of state law, for example, whether a plaintiff-buyer may sue a wholesaler or
a manufacturer—in addition to a direct retailer from whom he bought the
product.207 As a rule, the majority of American jurisdictions permit a plaintiff to sue
a wholesaler or manufacturer despite a technical lack of vertical privity between
those entities and the typical buyer.208
2.

Limitation or Exclusion of Liability

To be sure, sellers may exclude or modify express and implied warranties by
employing the mechanics of § 2-316.209 In particular, § 2-316(2) states in pertinent
part:
[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part
of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing
must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to
exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example,
that “There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the
face hereof.”210
And § 2-316 (3)(a) provides in addition:
[U]nless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are
excluded by expressions like “as is”, “with all faults” or other language

204.

Id.
See id. § 2-318 cmt. 3.
206. Id.
207. Id. § 2-318 (permitting states to choose among alternatives A, B, and C).
208. See Michael K. Steenson et al., Vertical Privity, 27 MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW § 5.19 (2014) (“The vast majority of authority now holds that express warranties in a product’s advertising
and packaging run directly to the ultimate purchaser and that lack of privity does not bar such claims.”).
209. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2012).
210. Id. § 2-316(2).
205.
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which in common understanding calls the buyer’s attention to the exclusion
of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty. . . .211
But, apparently, at present, it is not common practice for merchants who sell
sporting goods and equipment to do so.212 Consequently, if a manufacturer wishes
to minimize its exposure to liability for breach of warranty, manufacturers may
wish to incorporate language such as the following:
WARRANTY DISCLAIMER: THE MANUFACTURER EXPRESSLY
DISCLAIMS ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
INCLUDING THE WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY AND/OR
THE WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
SALESPERSONS MAY HAVE MADE ORAL OR WRITTEN
STATEMENTS ABOUT THE MERCHANDISE WHICH IS THE
SUBJECT OF THIS SALE. THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT
AUTHORIZED SUCH STATEMENTS AND SUCH STATEMENTS DO
NOT CONSTITUTE WARRANTIES, SHALL NOT BE RELIED ON BY
THE BUYER, AND ARE NO PART OF THE CONTRACT FOR SALE.213
This disclaimer must be clearly labeled as a “Warranty Disclaimer” (so that a
reasonable consumer should recognize that it is not “hidden” within a purported
warranty).214 Also, in order to be valid, it must be “conspicuous,” which the UCC
defines as:
so written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it
is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is “conspicuous” or
not is a decision for the court.215 Conspicuous terms include the following:

211.

Id. § 2-316(3)(a).
See, e.g., Company Policies, HANDMADE BASEBALL GLOVES, http://handmadebaseballgloves.com/policies.
html (last visited Sept. 10, 2014) (failing to an include a disclaimer on baseball gloves); Terms and Conditions,
KETTLER USA, http://www.kettlerusa.com/homePage/termsAndConditions?division=kettler+usa (last visited
Sept. 10, 2014) (lacking a disclaimer for bicycles); Terms and Conditions, SKIESSENTIALS.COM, http://www.skiess
entials.com/terms (last visited Sept. 10, 2014) (missing a disclaimer on snow skies).
213. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 434–46 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that one should “print all disclaimer language in bold-face capitals of a
contrasting color[,]” exclude the possibility of oral warranties, and use the word merchantability).
214. Id. at 440–44.
215. That is, it is a question of law for the judge to decide, not a question of fact for the jury to decide. See
U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (2012).
212.
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(A) a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding
text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same
or lesser size; and
(B) language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the
surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding
text of the same size, or set off from the surrounding text of the same size by
symbols or other marks that call attention to the language.216
Thus, it should be written prominently in a manner that calls attention to it;
such as a contrasting color or typeface (ALL CAPS or BOLDFACE should suffice).
Note that although the exclusionary language purports to disclaim any express
warranty, § 2-316(1) of the UCC creates a rule which, as a matter of fact, makes it
virtually impossible to disclaim express warranties.217

§ 2-316 Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words
or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other . . . negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.218
According to the rule of § 2-316(1), when faced with this issue, courts will
compare the language which the plaintiff argues creates an express warranty with
the language that the defendant claims excludes an express warranty.219 Then, to the
extent that the court considers the two to be inconsistent, the court construes that
inconsistency as rendering the purported exclusion void.220 The standard treatise on
commercial law takes the position that courts should enforce language in a

216.

Id.
Vincent A. Wellman, Essay: The Unfortunate Quest for Magic in Contract Drafting, 52 WAYNE L. REV.
1101, 1107 (2006) (“In other words, any attempt to disclaim an express warranty [under U.C.C. § 2-316] should
be assumed to be inoperative and ineffective.”).
218. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2012).
219. See Wellman, supra note 217.
220. Id. (“Both the Code and standard maxims of contract interpretation require that the disclaimer must
be read together with the warranty and the two must be understood together in the most reasonable way
possible under the circumstances.”). Thus, when reasonable, the warranty and disclaimer should be read
together. Id. Absent such reasonable accommodation, however, an attempt to disclaim the warranty will fail. Id.
217.
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warranty disclaimer that nullifies unauthorized verbal or written statements made
by salespeople such as that suggested.221
But even if courts are unwilling to enforce a warranty disclaimer of this type,
occasionally language such as this will deter a lawsuit because a consumer will read
the warranty disclaimer and assume that it is valid and binding.222 If a disclaimer
prevents even one lawsuit against a manufacturer or seller, it will be cost effective.223
Section 2-715 of the UCC provides that a seller may limit or exclude liability for
consequential damages.224 Many sellers in today’s marketplace commonly do just
this sort of thing by stating, for example, “[i]n no event shall seller be liable for
incidental or consequential damages. Seller’s liability is limited to refund, repair, or
replacement of defective goods.”225 However, when the consequential loss
complained of is personal injury, sellers have a much more difficult task in making
such an exclusion or limitation stand up in court. Subsection (3) of § 2-719 states:
“Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable. . . .”226
An unresolved question, then, is whether sporting goods equipment and other
apparatus are considered “consumer goods.” The General Definitions section of the
UCC (§ 1-201) does not define “consumer goods” but it defines “consumer” as “an
individual who enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes.”227 Although Article 2 does not define “consumer goods,”
Article 9 defines “consumer goods” as “goods that are used or bought for use
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”228 It would be strange to
think that whether this type of exclusionary language is considered “prima facie
unconscionable” may depend on the specific facts of each case (i.e., whether the
actual buyer purchases the goods on an individual basis or for an institution, such
as a school or club).229 For example, if a school were to purchase helmets for its
athletes, arguably, those helmets would not come within the definition of

221. See White, supra note 213, at 435 (“[I]f a party includes a clause in his contract which states that the
written contract is the ‘complete and exclusive agreement of the terms of the agreement,’ the most likely legal
consequence will be to exclude from evidence the proof of any oral warranty.”).
222. See U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 1 (2012). Section 2-316 was enacted in response to these types of
misunderstandings. Id.
223. See Rosemary E. Williams, Warranties Under Contract, 19A MARYLAND LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA: SALES OF
PERSONALTY § 40 (2014). The purpose of a disclaimer is to limit one’s liability; thus, any avoided litigation is
cost effective. Id.
224. U.C.C. § 2-715 (2012).
225. See id. § 2-719.
226. Id. § 2-719(3) (emphasis added).
227. Id. § 1-201(11).
228. Id. § 9-102(23).
229. Id. § 2-719(3).
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“consumer goods,” whereas if an individual athlete or athlete’s parent were to
purchase the same helmet, it would be considered “consumer goods.” It simply
seems unreasonable that the burden of proving unconscionability might depend on
the status of who happens to purchase any given article of sporting goods
equipment.

Summary
An injured athlete may have a viable strict product liability theory of recovery
against a seller or manufacturer, based on a manufacturing defect, a design defect,
or a failure to warn.230 In addition to direct defenses, an equipment manufacturer
may best defend such a suit by arguing: (1) that the plaintiff misused the product;
(2) that the plaintiff failed to heed properly-given warnings or instructions; (3) that
the product simply deteriorated over time through normal wear and tear; (4) that
the plaintiff assumed the risk; or, (5) that an unforeseeable, superseding act by a
third party was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury rather than defendant’s
product.231
An injured athlete may also have viable commercial law theories of recovery
against a seller and/or manufacturer, based on express warranty, implied warranty
of merchantability, and implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.232 The
UCC’s restrictions regarding a seller’s ability to exclude or limit liability for
personal injury make these theories especially attractive.233
Manufacturers may take several proactive steps to reduce their risks of liability
by continuing their research, development, and testing efforts aimed at achieving
product design safety.234 They ought to continue careful manufacturing and
inspection techniques and protocols in order to prevent product defects (including
mislabeling).235 For the warning labels, it would be prudent: (1) to expressly advise
consumers not to remove or cover the labels; (2) to add a warranty disclaimer
directly on each piece of equipment’s label, expressly stating:
WARRANTY DISCLAIMER: THE MANUFACTURER EXPRESSLY
DISCLAIMS ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
INCLUDING THE WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY AND/OR
THE WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
SALESPERSONS MAY HAVE MADE ORAL OR WRITTEN
230.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.E.
232. See supra Part II.A.
233. This may be particularly true in some circumstances, given that the UCC has a four-year statute of
limitations. See U.C.C. § 2-725 (2012).
234. See supra Part I.A.
235. See supra Part I.A–B.
231.
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STATEMENTS ABOUT THE MERCHANDISE WHICH IS THE
SUBJECT OF THIS SALE. THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT
AUTHORIZED SUCH STATEMENTS AND SUCH STATEMENTS DO
NOT CONSTITUTE WARRANTIES, SHALL NOT BE RELIED ON BY
THE BUYER, AND ARE NO PART OF THE CONTRACT FOR SALE.
and, (3) to advise consumers on the warning label affixed to each product to never
use sporting goods equipment which has sustained damage due to contact with a
hard surface.236 A sharp blow against any hard object can structurally damage the
equipment and cause breakage during subsequent use.237

236.
237.

See supra Parts I.D., II.G.2.
See supra Part I.D.
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